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Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about 
Citizen Influence on Government 
SHAUN BOWLER AND TODD DONOVAN* 
Theorists uch as Carole Pateman and Benjamin Barber suggest that democratic participation will 
engage citizens and lead them to have more positive regard for political processes and democratic 
practices. The American states provide a setting where provisions for direct voter participation 
in legislation vary substantially. If participatory institutions have an 'educative role' that shapes 
perceptions of government, then citizens exposed to direct democracy may be more likely to claim 
they understand politics and be more likely to perceive that they are capable of participation. They 
may also be more likely to perceive that government is responsive to them. We merge data on 
state-level political institutions with data from the 1992 American National Election Study to test 
these hypotheses with OLS models. Our primary hypotheses find support. We present evidence 
that the effects of exposure to direct democracy on internal and external political efficacy rival 
the effects of formal education. 
Recent scholarship has sought to understand citizen attitudes about government 
and high levels of cynicism about democratic politics.' Much of this work has 
considered the impact of socio-demographic changes over the past generation. 
Some work in this area has extended our understanding of attitudes towards 
government by incorporating the effects of institutional arrangements them- 
selves. An important component of these explanations has been the link between 
voter assessments of institutions and whether the voter 'wins' or 'loses' under 
those institutions. In shaping how fully someone may win or lose, and most 
* Department of Political Science, University of California Riverside; and Department of 
Political Science, Western Washington University, respectively. Earlier versions of this article were 
presented at the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Eugene, Oregon, 1999, and the 
Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, 2000. Authorship is equal. Direct 
correspondence to T. Donovan, Department of Political Science, Western Washington University, 
Bellingham, WA 98552, USA. 
1 Pippa Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Marc Hetherington, 'The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 
1968-96', American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), 311-26; Ola Listhaug, 'Confidence in 
Political Institutions: Norway, 1982-1996' (paper presented at the Centre for Nordic Policy Studies, 
Aberdeen, 1998); Stephen Craig, Broken Contract? Changing Relationships Between Americans and 
their Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Stephen Craig, The Malevolent Leaders: 
Popular Discontent in America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993); John Hibbing and Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); M. 
Kaase and K. Newton, Beliefs in Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Hans-Dieter 
Klingeman and Dieter Fuchs, Citizens and the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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372 BOWLER AND DONOVAN 
especially in determining how badly someone loses, institutions themselves 
colour how voters may view the political process.2 
Much, but not all, of this work has been cross-national in scope. In part this 
is because worries over growing cynicism about politics seemingly affect the 
industrial democracies in general.3 Cross-national studies allow for variation in 
institutional setting and so allow scholars to test institutionally based 
explanations. We follow the work of Frey4 and Frey and Stutzer5 to examine 
the question of whether institutional variation within one country, in this case 
the United States, can help explain variation in individual attitudes about a 
citizen's capacity to influence what governments do. Like Mendelsohn and 
Cutler6 and Frey and Stutzer, we examine the institution of direct democracy 
and the contribution it makes to citizen attitudes about influencing government. 
The main hypothesis of interest in what follows is that exposure to more 
frequent use of state-level direct democracy can cause citizens to have more 
positive attitudes about their abilities to influence the political system, and to 
have more positive attitudes about how government responds to them. 
Attitudinal measures of this capacity, or efficacy, are usually separated 
conceptually into two categories of internal and external efficacy.7 In short, we 
test whether citizens who are frequently exposed to decisions made by ballot 
initiative are more likely to see themselves as having resources and skills that 
allow them to influence what government does (internal efficacy), and whether 
they are more likely to see that government responds to them (external efficacy). 
Political efficacy is of interest here because it can play an important role in 
shaping a wide range of attitudes and behaviour. Internal efficacy represents a 
sense of 'being capable of acting effectively in the political realm', and external 
2 Chris Anderson and Christine Guillory, 'Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: 
A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems', American Political Science 
Review, 91 (1997), 66-81; Chris Anderson and Andrew LoTempio, 'Winning, Losing and Political 
Trust in America', British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 335-51; Stacy Gordon and Gary 
Segura, 'Cross National Variation in the Political Sophistication of Individuals: Capability of 
Choice?' Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 126-47; Ola Listhaug and M. Wiberg, 'Confidence in 
Political and Private Institutions' in Klingeman and Fuchs, eds, Citizens and the State; Harold Clarke 
and Alan Acock, 'National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy', British 
Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 551-62. 
3 Norris, Critical Citizens. 
4 Bruno Frey, 'A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues', Economic Journal, 107 
(1997), 1043-53. 
5 Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, 'Happiness, Economy and Institutions' (Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 15, 1999). 
6 Matthew Mendelsohn and Fred Cutler, 'The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens: 
Knowledge, Politicization, Efficacy and Tolerance', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 
685-98. 
7 Robert Lane, Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York: Free 
Press, 1959); George Balch, 'Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept of "Sense of 
Political Efficacy" ', Political Methodology, 1 (1974), 1-43; Stephen Craig and Michael Maggiotto, 
'Measuring Political Efficacy', Political Methodology, 8 (1982), 85-110. 
8 Steven Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis', 
American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 289-314, p. 289. 
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efficacy has been found to affect political trust,9 system support,10 and electoral 
participation.11 
Carole Pateman contends that democratic participation has an 'educative' 
role in the workplace, and writes of 'the human results that accrue through the 
participatory process'.12 To Pateman, these results include increased self- 
confidence for individuals and acquisition of the skills that citizens needed to 
participate, both of which comprise internal political efficacy. Other theorists 
suggest that political participation might simply instill passive acceptance of a 
regime - particularly in a standard electoral context where voters choose 
between parties or candidates. Electoral participation may thus promote feelings 
of system legitimacy and governmental responsiveness, affecting external 
efficacy but not internal efficacy.13 As we discuss below, however, there are 
solid theoretical reasons to expect that initiative and referendum elections 
present a context that is distinct from standard candidate and party elections, and 
that direct democracy can thus affect both internal and external political 
efficacy. 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
Many of the debates over direct democracy have concerned normative questions 
about the relative merits of direct versus representative democracy. This, in turn, 
has been tied to the related questions of whether or not direct democracy 
produces good or bad public policy, and whose interests it serves.'4 Regardless 
9 Stephen Craig, 'Efficacy, Trust and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering 
Conceptual Dilemma', American Politics Quarterly, 7 (1979), 225-39. 10 Shanto Iyengar, 'Subjective Political Efficacy as a Measure of Diffuse Support', Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 44 (1980), 249-56. 
11 Stephen Shaffer, 'A Multivariate Explanation of Decreasing Turnout in Presidential Elections, 
1960-1976', American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981), 68-96; Paul Abramson and John 
Aldrich, 'The Decline of Electoral Participation in America', American Political Science Review, 
76 (1982), 592-621. 
12 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), pp. 24-5. It is important to note that Pateman makes no claims that large-scale 
participation in the electoral arena could produce the same effects as small (workplace) settings that 
allow for discussion and personal interactions. We distil our hypothesis from her theory, and from 
proponents of mass-level direct democracy noted below. We do not claim that participation on ballot 
initiative questions can have the same qualitative effects on efficacy as small-scale democratic 
participation. 
13 See, for example, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen 
Control and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982), at p. 182. For 
empirical evidence from candidate elections, see Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects of Participation on 
Political Efficacy'. 
14 For an extensive review of these debates, see Elizabeth Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest 
Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999); Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion and Voting in Direct 
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy: 
The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1989); David Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the US (Baltimore, Md: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 
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374 BOWLER AND DONOVAN 
of academic conclusions about the merits of the process, there is substantial 
evidence of high levels of public satisfaction with direct democracy. Surveys 
of citizens in California,15 Washington,16 Oregon,17 and Florida18 find over 
two-thirds of respondents having favourable attitudes towards their state's 
initiative process. 
Other strands of discussions over the value of direct democracy, at least 
among proponents, have sought to emphasize the role it will play in motivating 
and energizing a sense of civic engagement and participation.19 It is an argument 
clearly in keeping with a long-held tradition from classical democratic theory 
that participation is not just of value in and of itself, but that it also has an 
educative role that promotes civic engagement and wider virtues.20 Similar 
themes have been echoed at least since de Tocqueville's observation that 
citizens learn political skills via participation in voluntary organizations.21 
Almond and Verba's study of citizen attitudes, for example, found that 
experiences with democratic decision making in schools or in families were 
related to adult participation in politics and to the belief that individuals can 
influence government. The effect held for citizens in Britain, Germany, Italy and 
Mexico.22 
As applied to contemporary direct democracy, the anticipated effects of 
participation have often been couched in terms of an expected favourable impact 
on turnout rates23 and increased civic engagement.24 Hard data, however, has 
15 Michael Hagen and Edward Lascher, 'Public Opinion about Direct Democracy' (paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association, Boston, 1998); Jack 
Citrin, 'Who's the Boss? Direct Democracy and Popular Control of Government', in Stephen Craig, 
ed., Broken Contract (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 268-93, at p. 272. 
16 Authors' annual statewide survey (1999), on file. 
17 Tim Hibbits, Oregon Public Opinion Polls, on file with authors (1999). 
18 Stephen Craig, Aimee Kreppel and J. Kane, 'Public Opinion and Direct Democracy: A Case 
Study', in Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, eds, Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites 
and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 25-46. 
'19 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984); Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
20 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 25; Michael Morell, 'Citizens' Evaluations 
of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science', Political 
Research Quarterly, 52 (1999), 293-322. 
21 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Volume II, translated by Henry Reeve, Phillips 
Bradley, ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945 [1840], pp. 114-18; Also see Robert Putnam, 
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
22 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1963). 
23 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 235-6; Cronin, Direct Democracy, p. 11; Budge, The New 
Challenge of Direct Democracy; David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums Around the World: 
The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994), pp. 15-16. 
24 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 284-5; David Schmidt, Citizen Lawmaking: The Ballot 
Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press, 1989). 
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cast some doubt on the stimulating effects of direct democracy on turnout.25 The 
more subtle effects of direct democracy on citizen attitudes about politics in the 
United States has rarely been tested,26 and studies of the effects of participation 
in legislative and executive elections in West Germany and the United States 
found that the act of voting might lead citizens to have a sense of greater 
governmental responsiveness, but that it does not cause feelings of increased 
political competence (internal efficacy).27 A rare empirical test of Pateman's 
theory in the workplace, however, found that greater democratization in 
industrial work settings was associated with higher levels of political efficacy.28 
Although exposure to referendum questions may not have the same educative 
effects as workplace democracy, it is reasonable to expect that referendums 
could have a greater effect on efficacy than elections to select representatives, 
as these latter decisions mediate the relationship between the citizen and policy 
outcomes. Work on Switzerland,29 for example, found signs of greater civic 
virtues and even happiness (in an attitudinal sense) in cantons that used direct, 
rather than just representative, democracy. Mendelsohn and Cutler also found 
evidence that the mass public learned about constitutional questions during the 
1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord in Canada, but they found no effect 
on efficacy.30 To be sure, these more general and attitudinal arguments have 
been presented before in the United States. Cronin, for example, notes one of 
the early arguments favouring direct democracy was that 'giving the citizen 
more of a role in governmental processes might lessen alienation and apathy'.31 
A key point here is that there have been no systematic tests of these more 
subtle effects of direct democracy in the setting of the United States, where the 
citizen's initiative device is used quite frequently. The issue of whether or not 
direct democracy has any effect on civic engagement has relevance to wider 
25 Cronin, Direct Democracy, pp. 227-8; Magleby, Direct Legislation, pp. 96-8; D. Everson, 
'The Effects of Initiatives on Voter Turnout: A Comparative State Analysis', Western Political 
Quarterly, 34 (1981), 415-25. Studies that do show a relationship between initiatives and turnout 
include Mark Smith, 'Ballot Initiatives, Voter Interest, and Turnout' (paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, 1999); Caroline Tolbert, John Gummel 
and Daniel Smith, 'The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American States' (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 
2000). 
26 For null findings at the bivariate level from the United States, see Citrin, 'Who's the Boss?' 
On Canada, see Mendelsohn and Cutler, 'The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens'. 
27 For claims about the limited effects of representative lections on self-perceived competence 
(internal efficacy), see Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy', at p. 908; 
Steven Finkel, 'The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Support: Evidence from a West 
German Panel Study', Journal of Politics, 49 (1987), 441-64, at p. 461. 
28 J. Maxwell Elden, 'Political Efficacy at Work: The Connection between More Autonomous 
Forms of Workplace Organization and a More Participatory Politics', American Political Science 
Review, 75 (1981), 43-58. 
29 Frey, 'A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues'; Frey and Stutzer, 'Happiness, 
Economy and Institutions'. 
3o Mendelsohn and Cutler, 'The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens'. 
31 Cronin, Direct Democracy, p. 11. 
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debates over the foundations of citizen attitudes towards government, and the 
issue of how such attitudes are rooted in institutional structures themselves. One 
question to be addressed before moving further is why direct democracy might 
have such a positive impact on voter attitudes. 
By definition direct democracy gives people a chance to participate in 
decisions that formally shape public policy and, as we noted above, this has long 
been held by some democratic theorists to be of value. Both the opportunity to 
participate, as well as the act of participation on policy decisions, can be 
expected to promote more positive views about the efficacy of individual 
political activity. At one level, it gives the mass public an occasional voice in 
government and provides some means - at least in principle - of ensuring that 
the public is consulted (or anticipated) in discussions about major policy issues. 
Work on Canadian attitudes about government, for example, points to the 
importance of being 'listened to' as a factor that shapes citizen attitudes about 
representative government generally.32 In a sense direct democracy assures 
voters that government either is listening to them or has to listen to them at some 
point. 
At a second level, direct democracy provides an additional mechanism for 
citizens to shape policy outcomes. Voting on policy provides citizens another 
method, in addition to representative government, for expressing their consent 
or opposition to what the government might do (or might not do). The degree 
to which government policy actually reflects voter desires is a matter of debate, 
yet there is some evidence that policy more closely matches mass preferences 
in the American states that use direct democracy than in those states that lack 
direct democracy.33 The effect of initiatives on policy could be direct, via voters 
approving legislation, or indirect, via pressure that the threat of initiatives places 
on legislators. In the realm of mass attitudes, however, part of what might matter 
is that voters simply believe their voices will be heard by public officials when 
citizens vote directly on issues. Likewise, they may believe they are heard in 
ways perceived to be qualitatively different than they are when their 
32 F. Graves, with T. Dugas and P. Beauchamp, 'Identity and National Attachments in 
Contemporary Canada (1)', in Harvey Lazar and Tom McIntosh, eds, Canada: The State of the 
Federation 1998-99 (Kingston, Ont.: Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, Vol. 13: How 
Canadians Connect, forthcoming). 
33 For evidence, see Elizabeth Gerber, 'Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives', 
American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 99-128; Elizabeth Gerber, 'Legislatures, 
Initiatives, and Representation: The Effects of State Legislative Institutions on Policy', Political 
Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 263-86; John Matsusaka, 'Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: 
Evidence from the Last 30 Years', Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 587-623. In contrast, 
see Edward Lascher, Michael Hagen and Steven Rochlin, 'Gun Behind the Door? Ballot Initiatives, 
State Policies and Public Opinion', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 760-75; John Camobreco, 
'Preferences, Fiscal Policies and the Initiative Process', Journal of Politics, 60 (1998), 819-29. For 
a related discussion of how PR election laws may bring legislators closer to voter preferences than 
SMD election laws, see G. Bingham Powell Jr. and Georg S. Vanberg, 'Election Laws, 
Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy', 
British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 383-411. 
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participation is limited to selecting representatives once every few years. When 
voting directly on initiatives and referendums, they may be one step closer to 
affecting policy outcomes than when they vote for candidates. 
Institutions of direct democracy thus provide a political context where many 
citizens must consider and decide upon public issues and policies - at least 
relatively more so than in a standard electoral context. Where initiatives appear 
frequently on state ballots, it is more likely that active campaigns or media 
coverage might focus public attention on a major public issue or set of issues. 
In such an environment, citizens may feel more competent about their political 
skills as they receive more policy-relevant information than would have 
otherwise been the case, at least at some minimal level. Many voters who 
participate on ballot questions will also deliberate about how to vote on issues 
by using multiple sources of information and by seeking out cues about who 
supports or opposes the measure.34 
Frey's argument goes further than this. He argues that in allowing citizens 
to participate in policy decisions, direct democracy bolsters civic virtues since 
the very system tells voters they are to be trusted. When treated as trustworthy, 
voters respond by being less cynical. The institution of direct democracy 
represents a constitutional expression of trust in citizens, in contrast to the more 
familiar constitutional expressions of mistrust.35 
HYPOTHESES 
One of the main hypotheses of interest, then, is that experience with direct 
democracy should promote more positive attitudes about the prospects for, and 
consequences of, citizen participation in the political system. Since we expect 
that institutions which provide extra-legislative opportunities for mass influence 
on policy are most relevant to the discussion above, we focus on experience with 
direct citizen initiatives in the states, rather than legislative referendums. And 
since it is relative levels of exposure to the practice of direct democracy that we 
expect to be of consequence, we treat direct democracy as a continuous variable 
here.36 Some states have formal mechanisms for use of the initiative, yet barriers 
such as court scrutiny and/or qualification hurdles can be such that, in practice, 
initiatives are rarely used in places where the institution exists (such as Illinois, 
Mississippi and Wyoming). Other states allowing the initiative have much more 
34 Arthur Lupia, 'Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California 
Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 63-76; Bowler and 
Donovan, Demanding Choices. 
35 Frey, 'A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues,' pp. 1048-9. 
36 Our models were also estimated with an ordinal measure of initiative use, found in Caroline 
Tolbert, 'Changing Rules for State Legislatures', in Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Caroline 
Tolbert, eds, Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1998), pp. 180-1. The substantive results remain the same. Interval measures are 
more readily interpreted, so those are reported here. 
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experience with the process, although there is great variation in use, with 
California, North Dakota and Oregon having used initiatives most frequently.37 
One of the only existing studies to examine the relationship between direct 
democracy and Americans' attitudes about government38 examined state-level 
attitudes in aggregate, while treating the presence of direct democracy as a 
simple dichotomy. This method failed to detect differences across states. 
However, if actual exposure to direct democracy leads citizens to have a greater 
sense that they can influence government, we should expect that frequency of 
initiative use39 in a citizen's state explains some variation in individual-level 
attitudes about political efficacy. We expect more initiatives generally to lead 
to greater efficacy, but we also examine whether this relationship is non-linear. 
It may be that modest levels of initiative use increase efficacy, but beyond some 
point citizens may be overwhelmed - very high levels of use thus might cause 
them to feel less capable of having influence. 
Running counter to this are two broad lines of argument. First, variants of this 
'opportunities for participation breeds efficacy' hypothesis have had a 
disappointing history. Real-world voters are often not nearly as responsive to 
the opportunities to participate as academics and intellectuals would like.40 The 
underwhelming track record of American mass political participation, and 
uniformly low levels of trust in government in the United States,41 suggest that 
the null hypothesis offers a fairly good chance of being supported in the 
American context. 
Secondly, the general literature on public regard for government tells us we 
must also account for rival hypotheses about other institutional effects that may 
well swamp that of direct democracy. One key factor is whether the voter 
supported candidates who lost in recent elections. That is, if the voter' s preferred 
candidates for office lost at election time, then the voter might come to feel that 
she has less 'voice' in government and could be correspondingly gloomier about 
the responsiveness of government to her needs.42 Contrary to Pateman's theory 
that greater participation in decisions will make citizens 'better' at democratic 
participating,43 the fact that a citizen is on the losing side of decisions might 
make her lose interest in politics, or at least lead her to have less sense that 
participation has positive consequences. State level variation in electoral results 
37 For discussion, see Caroline Tolbert, Daniel Lowestein and Todd Donovan, 'Election Law and 
Rules for Using Initiatives,' in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, eds, Citizens as Legislators, pp. 27-54. 38 Citrin, 'Who's the Boss?' p. 287. 
39 For a discussion of the advantages of measuring the use of direct democracy rather than the 
simple existence of formal provisions for its use, see A. Landner and M. Brandle, 'Does Direct 
Democracy Matter for Political Parties? An Empirical Test in the Swiss Cantons', Party Politics, 
5 (1999), 283-302. 40 However, see Morell, 'Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures'. 41 Craig, Broken Contract? 
42 Listhaug, 'Confidence in Political Institutions'; Norris, Critical Citizens; Anderson and 
LoTempio, 'Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America'; Clarke and Acock, 'National Elections 
and Political Attitudes'. 
43 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 25. 
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allows us to control for how individual voters stand in relation to the political 
system - as a 'winner' or 'loser' in terms of the candidates they supported at 
the top of the ballot. 
Another hypothesis from the broader literature suggests that fragmented 
control of political institutions can affect citizens' perceptions of governmental 
responsiveness. Listhaug and Wiberg's cross-national work, for example, 
shows that aside from economic conditions, the factors which strongly influence 
the degree of voter confidence in European governments are the (short) duration 
of governments and the number of parties in government. Multi-party coalitions 
and short-lived governments are viewed more negatively.44 The rise and fall of 
coalition governments and interparty bickering among coalition partners are, of 
course, not to be found in the American states. A rough analogy, however, might 
be that of divided government: voters living in states with divided government 
may find it more difficult to perceive who is responsible for policy outcomes. 
This could cause them to be less likely to believe they can direct government 
or hold it accountable. They may also be more likely to have a gloomier view 
of the governmental process than voters living where unified party control 
makes for less partisan bickering - at least in principle. 
In addition to these controls for rival institutional effects, models estimating 
attitudes about personal political abilities and governmental responsiveness 
should also include terms for individual-level factors known to affect efficacy 
generally. Political and attitudinal attributes should also be accounted for. 
Strong partisans for example, having a more coherent approach to viewing their 
political world, could be expected to have a greater sense of efficacy than 
independents and weak partisans. Economic evaluations have also been found 
to affect electoral support for government,45 and also affect general attitudes 
about trust in government.46 
Age, likewise, has been found to be related to trust and confidence in 
government. Citizens in younger age cohorts have been shown to have more 
cynicism about their relationships with government, and thus can have lower 
levels of efficacy.47 Social characteristics such as gender, education and race are 
also expected to structure how individuals perceive their capacity to affect what 
government does. Women may perceive themselves as having less influence in 
politics, leading them to be less likely to score high on efficacy measures.48 
Formal education is expected to give citizens resources and skills that help them 
negotiate the political world, so higher levels of education are thus one of the 
44 Listhaug and Wiberg, 'Confidence in Political and Private Institutions,' pp. 310-11. 
45 For a review, see Michael Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western 
Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988). 
46 Hetherington, 'The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-96'. 
47 M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi, Generations and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981). 
48 Paul Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco: 
Freeman, 1983). 
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main determinants of higher levels of political efficacy.49 The relationship 
between race (and minority ethnicity), direct democratic institutions and 
efficacy may be complex. Several highly visible ballot initiatives have targeted 
legislative policies that advanced minority interests50 and campaigns might turn 
mass opinions against minorities targeted by initiatives."1 This might lead 
minorities to have less efficacy where they are more frequently exposed to 
initiative politics. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The existing literature has demonstrated that political efficacy is a multi- 
dimensional phenomena, with two unique dimensions encompassing views of 
personal political abilities, or internal efficacy, and political influence, or 
external efficacy.52 The 1992 American National Election Study (NES) provides 
a fine opportunity to study factors that affect citizen attitudes on each of these 
dimensions.53 In addition to standard questions about governmental responsive- 
ness to citizens, the 1992 post-election study included a larger than usual array 
of questions on attitudes about the individual's sense of his or her own political 
abilities, and thus provides instruments that tap both internal and external 
political efficacy. A report on the first use of these measures in the 1987 NES 
Pilot Study and 1988 NES post-election study found that the items we use as 
measures of internal efficacy represent a single concept distinct from external 
efficacy and political trust.54 
49 For evidence of the effect of education on efficacy, see Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns and Kay 
Schlozman, 'Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement,' Journal of 
Politics, 59 (1997), 1051-72; Paul Abramson, Political Attitudes in America (San Francisco, 
Freeman, 1983); Carol Cassel and David Hill, 'Explanations of Turnout Decline: A Multivariate 
Test', American Politics Quarterly, 9 (1981), 181-95; Bernadette Hayes and Clive Bean, 'Political 
Efficacy: A Comparative Study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia', 
European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 261-80. 
50 Examples since the 1960s include measures attacking fair housing, desegregation of 
accommodation, school busing, welfare services, and affirmative action. For evidence of the adverse 
effects of initiatives on minorities, see Barbara Gamble, 'Putting Civil Rights to a Vote', American 
Journal of Political Science, 91 (1997), 245-69, and Derrick Bell Jr, 'The Referendum: Democracy's 
Barrier to Racial Equality', Washington Law Review, 54 (1978), 1-29. In contrast, see Bruno Frey 
and L. Gotte, 'Does the Popular Vote Destroy Civil Rights?' American Journal of Political Science, 
42 (1998), 1343-8 and Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, 'Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: 
An Extension', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 1020-5. 
51 James Wenzel, Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, 'Direct Democracy and Minorities: 
Changing Attitudes about Minorities Targeted by Initiatives', in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, eds, 
Citizens as Legislators, pp. 228-48. 
52 Abramson, Political Attitudes in America; Balch, 'Multiple Indicators in Survey Research'; 
Lane, Political Life. 
53 The 1992 NES sample includes respondents who were part of a multi-wave panel study. Since 
repeated exposure to surveys about politics might bias measures of political efficacy, we have limited 
our sample to cases who were part of the 'fresh wave' of 1992 respondents (i.e., respondents who 
were not previously interviewed in an earlier wave of the panel). 
54 Richard Niemi, Stephen Craig and Franco Mattei, 'Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 
1988 National Election Study', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 1407-13. 
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We conducted a Principal Components Analysis of seven efficacy measures 
relevant to this study, and results indicate that there are two distinct factors that 
structure responses. The four questions designed to measure internal efficacy 
load on a single, unique factor, while the two external efficacy questions load 
on a second unique factor.55 This suggests strongly that each respective set of 
items measures unique attitudinal phenomena, and that the items can be used 
to construct distinct indices of internal and external efficacy. 
Respondents were asked, for example, whether they felt government was too 
complicated for them to understand, whether they felt they were qualified to 
participate in politics, whether they thought they could do as good ajob in public 
office as others, and whether they thought themselves to be better or less 
informed about politics than other people. We use the responses to these 
questions as separate dependent variables in our assessment of the effect of 
direct democracy on respondents' perceptions of their own personal capabilities 
as a citizen - or their internal efficacy. Scores on these four items are then 
summed to create a general index of internal efficacy.56 
The 1992 NES survey also provides items that measure perceptions of how 
responsive government might be to citizens. For the second portion of our 
analysis, we use as our dependent variables two questions that ask respondents 
whether 'people like [them]' have any say in what government does, and 
whether government officials care about what 'people like [them]' think. These 
questions, we assume, are more likely to tap attitudes about external efficacy. 
Again, we use a summary index of these items to create a general measure of 
external efficacy.57 
Our independent variables are divided into three broad categories. The first 
group tests for the effects of institutions on attitudes. We account for frequency 
of direct democracy use with data from Tolbert et al. on the number of times 
that initiatives appeared on state ballots since the original date a state adopted 
procedures for the initiative." Scores on this variable range from 0 for 
55 See the web version of this article for this material. 
56 Cronbach' s a for the four-iterm internal efficacy index is 0.76. See the web version of this article 
for an appendix that includes question wording and codings. 
57 Cronbach' s a for the two-term external efficacy index is 0.68. We also estimated models of these 
indices using factor scores from the respective internal efficacy and external efficacy components 
generated from the Principal Components Analysis. This produced no substantive change in our 
results. Estimates of the indices allow for more straightforward interpretation of effects. See the web 
version of this article for an appendix that includes question wording and codings, as well as the 
principle component analysis results. 
58 Tolbert, Lowenstein and Donovan, 'Election Law and Rules for Using Initiatives', in Bowler, 
Donovan and Tolbert, eds, Citizens as Legislators, p. 29. An alternative version of our model was 
estimated with a measure of state initiative use limited to 1980-92, rather than frequency of use since 
adoption. Hypothesis tests using that model produced results identical to what is reported in Tables 
1 and 2. When the model was estimated using a dummy term for the effect of initiatives (where 1 = the 
state allows initiatives), the effect for direct democracy is generally significant, but less consistent 
than what is reported here. Model fit is slightly higher when frequency of use is used rather than a 
dummy term. 
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non-initiative states (and Mississippi) to between 3 to 274 for initiative states.59 
We use this rather than the number of initiatives on a state's ballot at the time 
of the survey because we believe it is the cumulative effect of exposure to direct 
democracy that should shape citizen attitudes.60 A respondent's status as a 
'loser' in elections is represented by a variable coded 1 to represent respondents 
who voted for a losing presidential candidate in 1992. Likewise, a similar 
dummy term reflects whether the candidate who won the 1992 US Senate 
seat in the respondent's state came from a party other than the party the 
respondent identified with. Residence in states where control of the legislature 
was divided between parties, or where different parties controlled the governor' s 
office and at least one legislative chamber, was also represented with a dummy 
variable. 
The second category of variables account for political and attitudinal factors 
that might affect efficacy. We include dummy terms for strong Democrats, 
strong Republicans and independents who do not lean to either party. The 
reference category is thus weak partisans and independents who 'lean' towards 
either party. These citizens have less interest in politics, and we expect them to 
have less efficacy as a result of their low interest and weak ties to parties.61 The 
model also includes measures of state and national economic evaluations (where 
high scores reflect economic worries). 
The final category of variables represent social and demographic factors 
discussed above (age, gender, race and education).62 We include an interaction 
between race (non-white) and initiative use to test if direct democracy reduces 
the political efficacy of non-whites.63 It is also possible that cultural or regional 
effects might structure individual efficacy, and these effects could covary with 
a state's use of direct democracy. States that use initiatives more frequently, for 
59 Respondents from thirty-three states were included in the NES sample. Of the 1,126 total cases, 
41 per cent are drawn from thirteen different initiative states. These include California (9.6 per cent 
of all cases), Michigan (6.4 per cent), Arizona (5.6 per cent), Florida (4.6 per cent), Massachusetts 
(3.5 per cent), Illinois (2.8 per cent), Missouri (2.3 per cent), Ohio (1.5 per cent), Arkansas (1.2 per 
cent), Oregon (1.1per cent), Colorado (1.1 per cent), Washington (0.9 per cent), and Wyoming (0.6 
per cent). Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, California, Massachusetts, Oregon and Washington score 
high on either measure of initiative use. 
60 States with most frequent use of initiatives over this period are: Oregon (274), California (232), 
North Dakota (160), Colorado (150), Arizona (133), Washington (91), Arkansas (80), Oklahoma 
(79), Missouri (60) and Ohio (58). 
61 Empirically, there is no distinction between the low levels of interest of weak partisans and 
independents who lean towards a party. We use 'pure' independents as a dummy variable (rather 
than as our reference category) as they are distinguished from weak partisans and independents who 
lean by lower levels of participation. See William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, Political Behavior 
of the American Electorate (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), pp. 77-9. 62 See the web version of the paper for codings of these variables. 63 The non-white category includes Latinos. All models reported here were also estimated with 
an additional variable controlling for respondent's income (V924105). Significance t sts for our main 
hypotheses are unchanged when income is included. Model fit with income is lower in five of the 
eight estimations reported here. Due to this, and the fact that refusals on this question reduce the 
sample, models are reported without income. 
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example, could have a political history and culture that led them to adopt the 
initiative, and that history might still affect contemporary political behaviour 
and attitudes.64 Likewise, western states that make more frequent use of the 
initiative tend to have greater in-migration, which could also covary with a more 
efficacious population. Each factor could cause an observed relationship 
between initiative use and efficacy to be spurious. 
We control for these factors by including an ordinal measure derived from 
Daniel Elazar's assessment of distinct American regional cultures that are 
defined by decades of migration patterns. Scores representing each state's 
political culture range over a nine-point continuum from 'moralistic' to 
'traditionalistic.'65 Residents of states with moralistic cultures (parts of New 
England, and much of the west) are expected to place greater value on 
participation, particularly 'amateur' and non-partisan participation,66 whereas 
residents of traditionalist states (much of the south) may accept more elitism and 
hierarchy.67 If residents of moralistic states have greater familiarity with or 
regard for participatory politics we might expect them to have higher levels of 
efficacy. 
RESULTS 
We have coded the dependent variables such that higher scores are associated 
with a more efficacious reply. Looking first at the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
coefficients generated from our models, we find evidence in Table 1 that 
respondents in states that frequently use direct democracy are more likely to 
claim they have resources and skills that we might expect to be advantageous 
- or at least desirable - for democratic citizens. They are more likely to claim 
to have a good understanding of political issues, are more likely to consider 
themselves qualified to participate in politics, and are more likely to feel that 
they are better informed about politics than other people. The one test that fails 
to reject the null hypothesis about direct democracy is in the expected direction, 
but fails to attain statistical significance. On balance, however, the estimate of 
the summary index of internal efficacy demonstrates that respondents are more 
64 For a discussion of this thesis, and of the geographic distribution of distinct political cultures, 
see Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A Viewfrom the States (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). 65 For the state culture measure, see Ira Sharkansky, 'The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A 
Research Note', Polity, 2 (1969), 66-83. For other applications of this variable, see David Lowery 
and Lee Sigelman, 'Political Culture and State Public Policy: The Missing Link', Western Political 
Quarterly, 35 (1982), 376-84; John Baker, 'Exploring the "Missing Link": Political Culture as an 
Explanation of the Occupational Status and Diversity of State Legislators', Western Political 
Quarterly, 43 (1990), 597-611. Elazar also includes an 'individualistic' culture in the centre of this 
continuum, and suggests (at p. 136) that the measure is one dimensional, as does Sharkansky (at 
p. 70). 
66 Elazar, American Federalism, at p. 118. 
67 Elazar, American Federalism, at p. 119. 
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likely to see themselves as competent citizens when living in an institutional 
context that makes active use of direct legislation. These findings stand in 
contrast to studies of participation in representative elections that find voting to 
have no effect on internal efficacy.68 
An alternative version of the model (not reported in the table) used a 
non-linear specification for frequency of initiatives to test if the effect on 
efficacy is muted or reversed at higher-levels of use.69 For each internal efficacy 
item, as well as the internal efficacy index, the non-linear terms were statistically 
insignificant. On one item (qualified to participate), the initial non-linear 
specification was significant. This effect, however, appears to be driven by 
respondents from California, one of the highest initiative-use states. When a 
dummy variable representing California is added to the linear and non-linear 
estimation of this attitude, the non-linear effect of initiative use becomes 
insignificant while the linear effect continues to predict positive attitudes about 
being qualified to participate. Californians, however, are significantly less likely 
to see themselves as well qualified in an estimation of the linear effect of 
initiative use, but they do not differ from the rest of the sample on all other 
measures of internal or external efficacy. When the California dummy is added 
to each of the other estimations (not reported here), there is no significant effect 
for California, and the linear effects of initiative use on efficacy reported in 
Table 1 remain unchanged.70 Thus, apart from the single estimation finding that 
Californians feel less qualified, there is no evidence that initiative use has 
reached levels that have a negative impact on our measures of efficacy. 
The substantive magnitude of the effect of initiative use on a respondent's 
internal efficacy index score in Table 1 (0.0056) can be expressed when the 
coefficient is multiplied by a state's use of initiatives. For example, the mean 
score on the internal efficacy index is 11.3. With all independent variables held 
constant a respondent from California (a high initiative use state) had a score 
about 1.3 points higher than a respondent from New York (which has no 
initiatives).7" Residence in a state with a history of high initiative use then, is 
associated with an internal efficacy score about 10 per cent beyond the mean. 
In contrast a one category increase on the education measure - which is equal 
to the difference between having a two-year or a four-year college degree - is 
associated with a score 0.811 points higher (or about 8 per cent above the 
mean).72 
68 Finkel, 'The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy', p. 461; Finkel, 'Reciprocal Effects 
of Participation on Political Efficacy', p. 908. 69 Where Y = = a + #*(frequency) - #*(frequency*frequency) + /*X ... 
70 The same is true when non-linear estimates, and estimates with dummy variables for Califor- 
nia, are used to re-estimate the models reported in Table 2. The non-linear specification and the 
addition of dummies for California, moreover, do nothing to improve model fit beyond the linear 
specification reported in Table 1 or Table 2. 
7' California's historic experience equals 232 initiatives (232 * 0.0056 = 1.29). 
72 The education measure is an ordinal rather than interval measure. Thus, it cannot be known if 
the effect of a change from 3 (high school completed) to 4 (some education beyond high school but 
no higher degree) on the scale is the same as a change from 5 (an AA degree) to 6 (a BA/BS degree). 
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There are also some notable effects for other institutional factors here. 
Respondents who identified with a party whose US Senate candidate was 
defeated in their state are generally less efficacious. Having voted for one of the 
losing presidential candidates is also associated with lower levels of internal 
efficacy on all but one of the measures. We also find that living in a state with 
divided government is associated with feeling less informed. The effects of 
being a loser in the electoral arena and residing in a state with divided 
government run in the opposite direction of the effects of direct democracy in 
every estimation, but the effect of divided government on the index of internal 
efficacy is not significant. 
Among variables that account for political/attitudinal factors, there is 
evidence in most estimations that lack of a strong party anchor (represented by 
'pure independents') is associated with less efficacy. Most of the variables that 
account for social and demographic traits are also important, with education and 
gender significant in every estimation. Increased education, as anticipated, 
provides a significant boost to citizens' perceptions of their political abilities. 
The effects of race and age appear to be less consistent, with race having little 
influence. There is partial evidence, however, that frequent use of direct 
democracy may have an adverse effect on non-whites' perceptions of their 
capabilities as citizens. The interaction term reflects that non-whites are less 
likely to see government as uncomplicated if they live in states that use 
initiatives more frequently. Non-whites residing in higher-use initiative states 
also have lower scores on the summary index of internal efficacy, but the effect 
is not statistically significant. The measure controlling for state political culture, 
furthermore, is also related to internal efficacy. Contrary to our expectations, 
respondents living in traditionalistic states are more confident that they are 
qualified to participate and do a good job in office, and score higher on the 
internal efficacy measure than residents of the most moralistic states. The 
important point here is that the indicator of state initiative use remains a 
significant predictor of efficacy even when variation in state culture - as defined 
by historic migration patterns - is accounted for.73 
Table 2 illustrates that our estimates of external efficacy - or perceptions of 
governmental responsiveness - also support the hypothesis that more frequent 
direct democratic practice leads citizens to have a greater sense that government 
is responsive. Citizens residing in higher-use initiative states are more likely to 
claim that 'people like [them]' have a say about what 'the government' does, 
and are more likely to claim that 'public officials' care about what 'people like 
[them]' think. As in Table 1, non-linear specifications of the effect of initiative 
73 A discussion about why residents of traditionalistic states have higher efficacy is beyond the 
scope of this article. The effect of initiative use remains the same when this variable is included or 
omitted. We should also note that these models were re-estimated with a measure of state-level 
residential mobility (100 - per cent born in state, 1990). This variable was not significant in any 
estimation. It was mildly collinear with the state culture measure, and is not included in the results 
reported here. 
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TABLE 1 Direct Democracy and Citizen Attitudes about their Political Abilities 
Govt. not Qualf. to Do Good Well Internal 
Complicated Particip. Job Informed Efficacy 
Institutional Variables 
Frequency of 0.0015** 0.0017** 0.0008 0.0014* 0.0056** 
Initiative Use (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0017) 
Presidential - 0.209* - 0.419** - 0.139 - 0.468** - 1.24** 
Loser (0.092) (0.095) (0.098) (0.088) (0.272) 
Senate - 0.242** - 0.257** - 0.310** - 0.137 - 0.951** 
Loser (0.090) (0.094) (0.097) (0.087) (0.269) 
Divided Govt. - 0.097 - 0.024 - 0.080 - 0.184t - 0.235 
(0.114) (0.118) (0.121) (0.109) (0.337) 
Political Variables 
Strong Democrat - 0.079 0.130 - 0.062 0.118 0.082 
(0.120) (0.124) (0.128) (0.115) (0.354) 
Strong Republican 0.270* 0.184 - 0.097 0.226t 0.618t 
(0.128) (0.133) (0.137) (0.123) (0.376) 
Pure Independent - 0.113 - 0.391** - 0.249* - 0.217t - 0.934** 
(0.125) (0.131) (0.134) (0.120) (0.371) 
National Economy - 0.059 - 0.018 - 0.042 - 0.025 - 0.143 
Worse (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.113) 
State Economy - 0.032 - 0.056 - 0.001 - 0.040 - 0.135 
Worse (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.131) 
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Social Variables 
Non-white* - 0.0029t 0.001 - 0.001 0.0004 - 0.002 
Freq. of Initiative (0.0015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age - 0.001 - 0.006* - 0.007** 0.001 - 0.014* (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Female - 0.177* - 0.355** - 0.376** - 0.359** - 1.23** 
(0.079) (0.082) (0.084) (0.076) (0.234) 
State Political 0.002 0.062** 0.045* 0.0002 0.110t 
Culture (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.065) 
Non-white 0.184 0.200 0.313* - 0.121 0.469 
(0.128) (0.133) (0.136) (0.122) (0.376) 
Education 0.252** 0.202** 0.181** 0.175** 0.811*" (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.071) 
Constant 2.40** 3.19** 2.90** 3.25** 11.76** 
(0.333) (0.346) (0.355) (0.320) (0.985) 
Number of Cases 916 916 915 915 913 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.157 0.107 0.134 0.218 
Source: 1992 NES Post-election study, Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research, Ann Arbor, Mich. Study # 6067. SPSS code to estimate the models 
are available from the authors. 
t Significant at p < 0.10 (two-tail). 
* Significant at p < 0.05 (two-tail). 
** Significant at p < 0.01 (two-tail). 
Note: Table entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables = NES variables V926104, V926106, V926107, V926108. 
See Appendix (in web version of this article) for coding. Internal Efficacy is a summary index of these four items. 
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TABLE 2 Direct Democracy and Citizen Attitudes about Governmental 
Responsiveness 
Has Say Officials External 
in Govt. Care Efficacy 
Institutional Variables 
Frequency of 0.0022** 0.0012* 0.0026*: 
Initiative Use (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Presidential - 0.312** - 0.401** - 0.377** 
Loser (0.105) (0.097) (0.134) 
Senate - 0.053 - 0.045 - 0.098 
Loser (0.103) (0.096) (0.132) 
Divided Govt. - 0.349** - 0.198t - 0.436** 
(0.130) (0.120) (0.166) 
Political Variables 
Strong Democrat - 0.020 - 0.054 0.026 
(0.136) (0.127) (0.175) 
Strong Republican 0.133 0.342* - 0.018 
(0.146) (0.136) (0.187) 
Pure Independent - 0.091 0.005 - 0.187 
(0.144) (0.133) (0.183) 
National Economy - 0.110* - 0.083* - 0.143* 
Worse (0.043) (0.040) (0.056) 
State Economy - 0.055 - 0.118* - 0.032 
Worse (0.050) (0.047) (0.064) 
Social Variable 
Non-white* - 0.001 - 0.0029t - 0.001 
Freq. of Initiative (0.001) (0.0016) (0.002) 
Age - 0.001 0.001 - 0.004 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female - 0.022 0.159* - 0.081 
(0.090) (0.083) (0.115) 
State Political - 0.043t - 0.031 - 0.047 
Culture (0.025) (0.023) (0.032) 
Non-white - 0.031 - 0.019 0.040 
(0.145) (0.135) (0.186) 
Education 0.192** 0.142** 0.128** 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.035) 
Constant 3.97* 3.24** 6.69** 
(0.380) (0.352) (0.487) 
Number of cases 916 913 913 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.075 0.081 
Source: 1992 NES Post-election study, Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political 
Research, Ann Arbor, Mich. Study No. 6067. SPSS code to estimate the models is available from 
the authors. 
t Significant at p < 0.10 (two-tail). * Significant at p < 0.05 (two-tail). ** Significant at p < 0.01 
(two-tail). 
Note: Table entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent 
variables = NES variables V926102 and V926103. The index is a sum of these two variables (see 
Appendix in web version of paper for coding). 
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use on external efficacy (not reported) were statistically insignificant. Thus, we 
find no clear evidence that a history of high levels of initiative use might 
overwhelm citizens. 
Again, the substantive magnitude of the effect of initiative use is not trivial, 
particularly when compared to the relatively limited effect that variation in 
formal education has on external efficacy. Consider that the mean score on the 
summary index of external efficacy is 5.4. Using estimates of this index from 
Table 2, a respondent from California would be predicted to have a score 0.6 
points higher74 than a respondent from a non-initiative state. If this effect is 
considered as added to the mean external efficacy score, it would produce a score 
11 per cent above the mean. A shift from a two-year to a four-year degree (or 
from a BA/BS to an advanced degree), in contrast, is associated with only a 
0.127 increase on the external efficacy index, which is equal to being about 2 
per cent above the mean. With one of the external efficacy items, however, the 
effect of frequent use of initiatives operates differently on non-whites. 
Non-whites living in states that use more initiatives are less likely to claim that 
'public officials' care about what they think. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that direct democracy, by producing outcomes that harm minorities, 
has a negative effect on minority citizens' attitudes about having influence in 
government. 
Again, in Table 2 we also see that presidential electoral outcomes shape a 
citizen's perceptions of how responsive the government is to them personally. 
Respondents living in states with divided government are significantly less 
likely to claim they have a say. Overall, however, our models do a better job 
explaining variance in internal efficacy than external efficacy. Gender, age and 
lack of strong partisanship, which were significant in most estimations of 
internal efficacy, have less of a role in estimates of external efficacy. 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings are consistent with the theory that direct participatory models of 
democracy may encourage a greater sense of efficacy, and possibly, civic 
engagement. People living in states that use more initiatives tend to have more 
positive views of their own political abilities and look more favourably on the 
responsiveness of government. We also find a pattern that is consistent with 
recent work examining how democratic institutions influence citizens' 
perceptions of politics. Being on the losing side of candidate elections tends to 
make citizens have less positive attitudes about their political abilities and have 
less positive attitudes about governmental responsiveness. 
Institutional effects are not the only things that shape a citizen's perceptions 
about how they influence government. Other factors, most notably education, 
also contribute to feelings of political efficacy. But the findings here indicate 
that use of state-level initiatives may contribute to American democracy 
generally by instilling a greater sense that citizens have the ability to shape what 
74 AS in fn. 4 (232 * 0.0026 = 0.603). 
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their governments do. The substantive magnitude of the effect, moreover, rivals 
that of education, which has been demonstrated to be a consistent predictor of 
efficacy.75 An extension of our logic suggests that citizens who consistently see 
themselves on the losing end of initiative contests, like those on the losing end 
of candidate contests, may have lower levels of political efficacy. Although we 
do not have direct measures of a respondent's support for various ballot 
measures, we find some indirect evidence of this effect. Non-white respondents 
residing in initiative states are less efficacious on some, but not most, of the 
instruments used to measure efficacy here. 
It remains to be established what effect this increased sense of efficacy may 
have on participation in politics, and on other attitudes. It is also difficult to 
establish whether our findings reflect citizen perceptions that are shaped by 
actual policies enacted via initiative (or via legislatures operating under the 
threat of initiatives), or whether attitudes merely represent some response to a 
less consequential 'sound and fury' of initiative politics. That is, a democratic 
process of 'assured listening' that provides only an illusion of political influence, 
without actually altering policies, may also shape attitudes. It is possible then, 
that citizens may receive a false sense of empowerment from the use of 
initiatives if ballot measures have no consequence on policy, or if these 
measures advance policies that are inconsistent with the preferences of most 
citizens in a state. We do not expect that this is the case, however. There is 
mounting evidence that direct democracy does influence legislative behaviour 
by encouraging legislators to adopt policies that more closely mirror mass 
preferences.76 It seems reasonable to expect that a significant number of citizens 
are aware of this in direct democracy states and, thus, feel a greater sense of 
political efficacy than citizens in non-initiative states. In an era when cynicism 
about politics is high, these findings should not be seen as trivial. 
Finally, we must acknowledge two caveats. First, the causal argument we 
offered could be reversed. Citizens may use their rights to the initiative in places 
where they are more efficacious, rather than having such initiatives cause them 
to feel more competent. Since our data are drawn at the mass level, however, 
we expect that our findings reflect citizens responding to initiatives that they 
probably did not initiate. Secondly, the level of analysis we employ could affect 
our results. As noted above, initiatives have been used more frequently in the 
United States in recent decades while efficacy has been in decline. This would 
suggest that frequent use of direct legislation - although associated with 
cross-sectional differences at a point in time - probably does not arrest secular 
declines in citizen efficacy. Direct democracy as practised in the United States 
might thus explain important differences in citizen attitudes across space, but 
not necessarily across time. 
75 On the effect of education on efficacy, see Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 'Knowing and Caring 
about Politics'; Abramson, Political Attitudes in America; Cassel and Hill, 'Explanations of Turnout 
Decline'; Hayes and Bean, 'Political Efficacy'. 
76 Gerber, 'Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives'; Gerber, 'Legislatures, 
Initiatives, and Representation'; Matsusaka, 'Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative'. 
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